Introduction
A ircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy are the largest warships in the world. 1 With their embarked air wings, carriers are deployed worldwide to serve a variety of roles in peacetime and during global crises. Carriers are manned by Ͼ5,000 personnel, with the exact complement depending on the class of ship and specific employment. There are hundreds of details and jobs associated with operating this small city 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, at sea, such as food preparation, production of electricity, steam, and fresh water, propulsion and auxiliary systems, and operation and maintenance of all of the weapons, communications, navigation, and assorted systems, as well as the numerous complex aspects of flight operations.
In general U.S. industry, it is estimated that Ͼ6 million workers are injured each year, with insurance, health care, lost time, and worker replacement and retraining costs of $121 billion. 2 The military has the potential for similar injuries but has a much smaller manpower pool to draw from and a longer logistics tail during deployments. Military training, recreational, and work injuries are the most significant source of loss of manpower, hospitalizations, and reduction of readiness. 3 During the period of 1980-1993, active duty Navy personnel suffered 4,607 deaths attributable to unintentional injuries (59.4 deaths per 100,000 population), with an all-cause mortality total of 7,485 (96.5 deaths per 100,000 population). Unintentional injuries include disease, illness, suicide, homicide, deaths attributable to hostile action, and miscellaneous causes. 4 As of October 3, 2003 , there were 383,890 active duty personnel in the Navy, i.e., 55,317 officers and 328,573 enlisted personnel. There were also 185,550 Navy Department civilian employees and 152,464 Ready Reservists. 5 The average age of the enlisted personnel in the Navy is 27 years (51% of all enlisted personnel and 44% of the total force are below this age). On average, officers are approximately one decade older (35 years of age) than enlisted personnel 6 (D. Thao, unpublished data). This is an analysis of a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier's mishap and injury database covering two 6-month deployments to the same general operating areas, in 1999 and 2001. The purpose was to determine trends in injury types, causes, and basic demographic features. The information described here may assist U.S. Navy leaders and safety managers in developing risk-reduction strategies. The Secretary of Defense set an ambitious goal for all U.S. military services to reduce all-cause mishap and accident rates by 50% in the next 2 years. 7 President George W. Bush followed up the Department of Defense goal with a similar goal for all U.S. federal agencies to reduce accidents and injuries by implementing the Safety, Health, and Return-to-Employment initiative. President Bush established four specific workplace goals, each of which is relevant to this research and discussion, namely, lower injury/illness rates, lower lost-time injury/illness rates, timely reporting of injuries/illnesses, and fewer lost days from work injuries and illnesses. 8 After establishment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the U.S. military adopted many safety and injury prevention programs similar to those of the civilian workforce. Several U.S. presidential executive orders later broadened the requirements for the military to more fully comply with all aspects of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The Navy Occupational Safety and Health Program does include numerous points that are unique to the Navy operational environment. 9 The U.S. Naval Safety Center is charged with overall safety program oversight for the Navy. 10 The Safety Center wrote specific program instructions for the Navy, including ashore (OPNAV5100.23F) and afloat (OPNAV5100.19D, CH-1) Navy Occupational Safety and Health Program manuals. 9 New U.S. Naval Safety Center reporting criteria that are not reflected in this study went into effect in October 2002, requiring the reporting of all injuries that cause Ն1 lost workdays. 9 Until the start of 2003, most injuries were never reported or recorded off ship unless they met certain criteria, as defined by the Naval Safety Center. Direct comparison of the incidence densities of total injuries between ships is impossible even today, because of the lack of a central reporting repository that tracks all injuries, including non-lost time cases. In the past, direct comparisons were normally made only for reportable categories (e.g., class A mishap fatality rates).
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Injuries and occupational illnesses are divided into nonreportable, special case (a subcategory of class C), and class A/B/C events, as defined in Table I . 9, 12 Nonreportable mishaps are minor injuries, including all mishaps that are not specifically described by a particular case definition; these are the types of injuries of particular interest for this study, because there previously was no comprehensive off-ship oversight (i.e., they were not reported to the Naval Safety Center unless they met a case definition for special case mishaps). Navy class C injuries formerly included injuries resulting in Ն5 lost work days but now include any injury or occupational illness causing lost work time beyond the day or shift when the injury occurred.
The Naval Safety Center started a new injury database that became the only official injury tracking system for the U.S. Navy as of January 1, 2003 . This World Wide Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS) is the Injury/Occupational Illness System and replaces previous paper logs and the injury-tracking, shore facility, personal computer-based program. WESS applies to all ashore and afloat units but was not in place during the time of this study. The old systems (e.g., the injury-tracking program for shore-based commands) did not report mishaps resulting in 1 to 4 lost workdays to the Naval Safety Center, for aviation, afloat, motor vehicle, and off-duty injuries. All communities are still required, as in the past, to report the loss of Ն5 workdays to the Naval Safety Center by Navy Message or similar method. There is now a parallel requirement to enter the data into the WESS. In addition, there is a new requirement for shore communities to report all injuries and illnesses, regardless of lost time (including all first aid [civilian workers only], no lost time, lost time, and fatality cases), via the WESS within 6 days of the mishap. There is a new requirement for reporting of aviation, afloat, motor vehicle, and off-duty injuries involving 1 to 4 lost workdays via the WESS within 6 days of the mishap. In addition, the Afloat Safety Instruction (OPNAVINST 5,100.19D) Mishap Reporting Requirements will be superseded by the upcoming OPNAVINST 5102.1D (Mishap Investigation and Reporting). 11 It appears that these new systems will still not track all injuries, as recommended by Jones and Hansen 3 and Writer et al. 13 Whereas civilian hospitals use International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification external cause-ofinjury codes, military hospitals use NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2050 codes. Amoroso et al. 14, 15 described how the STANAG codes do not adequately reflect industrial and other accidents that are often encountered by the military. In addition, outpatient, ambulatory care visits onboard U.S. Naval combatant ships are not coded with the STANAG coding in the onship injury reports (used for the onship tracking, as reported in this research), and data capture thus becomes even more difficult. Also, many previous studies of military injuries were unique to basic training or associated school commands, which tend to have a large preponderance of physical exercise-related injuries. 16, 17 Similarly, studies of U.S. Army injuries often have a preponderance of physical exercise (including marching)-related injuries that do not apply to a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier cohort of personnel. 18 In addition, the disease, non-battlefield injury (DNBI) case definitions and rates that are traditionally used by the military include disease-related inpatient, outpatient, and sick-call medical treatments; the focus in this research was on injuries only.
Methods
The ship's injury databases were maintained by the ship's Safety Department to document reportable and nonreportable injuries, to meet U.S. Naval Safety Center requirements to investigate and ameliorate mishap causes. 9 The ship's Medical Department attended patients each day at regular sick calls and was available 24 hours per day for emergencies. After Medical Department personnel assisted a patient, the duty corpsman filled out an accident and injury report (usually kept as a local form on each ship, without specific mandated requirements). A copy of this form was given to the Safety Department and used for mishap tracking and analysis of the dynamic cohort of the ship's permanent party (i.e., ship's company personnel) and embarked airwing and staff personnel.
The safety officer is required to track all injuries on the ship and to initiate investigations if necessary. 9 The relevant fields from the paper form were entered into the database, and safety personnel keyed in additional data and coded the injury category (such as slip/trip/fall, burn, or shock).
The cohort, with replacement and without control, described here and displayed in Figure 1 was based on manning during peacetime operations. An aircraft carrier contains mainly the ship's crew and airwing personnel. Other staff personnel (battle group commander's staff, destroyer squadron commander's staff, and others) are also onboard. A 6-month deployment is Permanent partial disability or three or more persons hospitalized as inpatients C $20,000 or more but less than $200,000
Nonfatal injury resulting in loss of time from work beyond day/shift when injury occurred Afloat Special Case Mishap (subcategory of class C) N/A Electric shock, Hazardous material, chemical, or toxic exposure requiring medical attention All mishaps involving explosives, oxidizers, incendiaries, explosive systems, or chemical warfare agents All diving cases involving central nervous system oxygen toxicity, pulmonary overinflation syndrome, or hyperbaric treatment All cases of back injury resulting from a mishap requiring medical attention normally scheduled every 18 months, depending on operational tempo and other factors, including the geopolitical climate. The manpower of the ship's company and airwing is fairly stable, with ϳ10% of the crew being transferred and replaced during the cruise, generally with little gap in time but often with an appreciable gap in training and experience. Most officers are on 2-to 3-year tours (equating to one or two consecutive cruises on the same ship), and most of the enlisted personnel are on 3-year, 4-year, or longer tours (equating to two or three consecutive cruises on the same ship).
Data were entered in Microsoft Windows98 Access and were tabulated and graphed with Windows98 Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, Washington). Statistical tests were performed with Stata software (Stata Corp., College Station, Texas). Fisher's exact p value (analogous to the 2 test but appropriate for small samples) was used to compare incidence densities between subpopulations and between cruise populations.
Certain assumptions were made during this analysis. This particular carrier was scheduled to decommission during fiscal year 2003; therefore, few women were billeted to the ship, compared with other aircraft carriers. Massive ship alterations were not made to accommodate female personnel, and few were embarked. Only approximately 100 (2.0%) of the 5,100 crew members were female, and only 7 (2.4%) of the 291 injuries in 1999 and 8 (1.9%) of the 412 injuries in 2001 involved female personnel. Therefore, the aspect of gender is not properly identified and findings cannot be compared with incidence densities for other ships, because of the limited statistical base. The average U.S. Navy aircraft carrier has approximately 500 to 600 women in ship's company and 100 to 300 in the airwing and embarked staffs, with an average of 5,100 to 5,900 total personnel 1 (J.
Porter, unpublished data; S. Dunn, unpublished data; S. George, unpublished data; C. Wilhite, unpublished data; and J. Zumwalt, unpublished data). Injuries recorded in the Safety Department database reflected only those mishaps that occurred on the ship and were properly recorded by the Medical Department on the local mishap report or were otherwise reported to the Safety Department. For example, minor injuries that were self-treated by service members would not be reflected, although most sailors sought their primary medical care onboard the ship. During a cruise, almost all off-ship injuries were likely to be seen by Medical Department personnel or otherwise reported to the Safety Department. Historically, a ship's manpower base changes radically during nondeployed periods (in port or undergoing maintenance) or training locally for the next deployment. Manpower changes are attributable to off-ship training requirements and squadrons returning to their home base, as well as personnel being treated in civilian and military hospitals (with the possibility that injuries would never be reported to the Safety Department for data capture). Therefore, the analysis here is only of cruise injuries in a fairly stable population, allowing calculation of incidence densities.
The time of injury was not correlated with the shift that the person was working when the injury was recorded. Therefore, it was impossible to adequately address sleep deprivation and circadian rhythm issues, as described by Goh et al. 19 Injury incidence densities were compared by ship status (i.e., in port or underway). We hypothesized that risk would increase with increasing time underway, but we were unable to confirm this hypothesis. The operational tempo (i.e., number and type of aircraft sorties per day) of the ship and employment are not discussed here, but flight operations are only one aspect of the life of a ship. Even if a carrier is not flying aircraft, a host of other activities are being performed, including continuous operation of the engineering plant (generation of electricity, steam, water, and ship's propulsion) 24 hours per day for Ն6 months and many other shipboard occupations, each with attendant risks. Different ports of call also have different requirements, including possible changes in the engineering plant status and required maintenance such as hull painting.
Results
Table II compares the number of days at sea and in port, the injuries, and the mishap incidence densities during two cruises. There was an average of 3,130 ship's company and 1,971 airwing personnel for both cruises. The population was dynamic but had turnover with replacement. There were 195 injuries among ship's company personnel during the 1999 Western Pacific deployment (WESTPAC99) (3.33 injuries per 10,000 person-days or 62 injuries per 1,000 personnel) and 262 during the 2001 Western Pacific deployment (WESTPAC01) (4.55 injuries per 10,000 person-days or 84 injuries per 1,000 personnel during the 6-month cruise). For the 1,971 airwing, staff, and other embarked personnel, there were 96 injuries in WESTPAC99 (2.60 injuries per 10,000 person-days or 49 injuries per 1,000 personnel during the cruise) and 150 in WESTPAC01 (4.14 injuries per 10,000 person-days or 76 injuries per 1,000 personnel during the cruise). This equaled 291 injuries in WESTPAC99 (3.05 injuries per 10,000 person-days for the ship or 1.6 injuries per day or 57 injuries per 1,000 personnel during the cruise) and 412 injuries in WESTPAC02 (4.39 injuries per 10,000 person-days for the ship or 2.2 injuries per day or 87 injuries per 1,000 personnel during the cruise), among 5,101 total personnel. The differences between the two cruises may be attributable to actual increases or may be an artifact of better or different record keeping.
Injury incidence densities were significantly higher in WESTPAC01 than in WESTPAC99 (rate ratio, 1.44; 95% confidence interval, 1.24-1.68; p Ͻ 0.001). This was true for both the ship's company personnel (rate ratio, 1.37; 95% confidence interval, 1.13-1.65; p Ͻ 0.001) and the airwing, staff, and other embarked personnel (rate ratio, 1.59; 95% confidence interval, 1.22-2.07; p Ͻ 0.001). Averaging across both cruises, there were 3.94 injuries per 10,000 person-days among ship's company personnel and 3.36 injuries per 10,000 person-days among airwing, staff, and other embarked personnel, but this difference did not reach statistical significance (rate ratio, 1.17; 95% confidence interval, 1.00-1.37; p ϭ 0.05). Figure 1 shows the manning levels for the ship. Figure 2 shows the injury incidence densities by ship's company departments. As expected, the Deck, Weapons, Air, and Engineering Departments had the highest injury incidence densities. This was probably attributable to their work conditions, with longer work hours, more physically demanding environments, dangerous equipment, and employment of more junior personnel, compared with many of the other departments. The Legal Department also showed high injury rates, probably because of personnel issues (this department includes personnel who are in the brig, being discharged from the service for legal infractions, and others who are at high risk for injury, including fight-related injuries). Figure 3 shows the injury incidence densities by airwing squadrons and airwing and embarked staffs. The Explosive Ordnance Demolition detachment had few personnel onboard; therefore, any injuries produced a disproportionately high injury rate. The fighter squadrons had more personnel but also had slightly higher injury incidence densities than did the other squadrons. The specific causes of this increase are unknown. Figure 4 describes the injury incidence densities by rank and details the injury density for the particular rank groups. The ship's company and airwing/staff injury incidence densities were comparable. Generally, few civilians are embarked on an aircraft carrier; therefore, even one injury results in a high incidence density for that subpopulation. The largest numbers of injuries were suffered by the most junior personnel. The most common injuries are listed in Figure 5 . Slips, trips, and falls were the most common generic injuries, followed by cuts.
There was no significant difference between injury rates in port and at sea for the crew as a whole. In WESTPAC99, there were 3.19 injuries per 1,000 person-days at sea and 2.60 injuries per 1,000 person-days in port (rate ratio, 1.23; 95% confidence interval, 0.91-1.67; p ϭ 0.16). In WESTPAC01, there were 
Discussion
Personnel on cruises generally take time to settle down to the job. That is probably attributable to the time required for personnel to focus on the task at hand, to train new personnel (either new to the job or new to the Navy), and to acclimate to the particular operating regimen (e.g., day and night operations, shift changes, and temperature extremes). This was anecdotally associated in the past with an increase in injuries at the beginning of a cruise, but this was not borne out by analysis of these data. Figure 6 shows the relationship between injury densities and weeks on the cruise as experienced by this ship. The increased incidence density of mishaps in the middle of the cruise during WESTPAC01 was not mirrored in WESTPAC99; no logical explanation presents itself, other than possibly the effect of a different operational tempo for one cruise, compared with the other (the time of year and numbers, lengths, and times of port calls were similar).
Personnel can become stressed during a cruise, develop short tempers, and engage in more active risk-taking to relieve boredom, with a possible increase in the number of injuries. "Near misses" can be used as indicators of problem personnel or bad habits, but near misses are very hard to adequately measure Fig. 1 ). Fig. 3 . Injury incidence density for 1,971 squadron and staff personnel during two cruises, WESTPAC99 (2.60 injuries per 10,000 person-days for all squadron and staff personnel) and WESTPAC01 (4.14 injuries per 10,000 person-days) (abbreviations as for Fig. 1). and report. Minor injury rates or incidence densities are often used as a surrogate for near misses. There is no single, allencompassing figure to adequately reflect the confounder of operational tempo for even the major departments of the ship (i.e., Air, Supply, and Engineering). In WESTPAC99 there was a significant decrease in injury rates toward the end of the cruise. During months 5 and 6 of the cruise, there were 2.27 injuries per 1,000 person-days, compared with 3.38 injuries per 1,000 person-days during months 3 and 4 (rate ratio, 1.49; 95% confidence interval, 1.10-2.03; p ϭ 0.008). In WESTPAC01, injuries peaked in the middle of the cruise but that is also the heaviest operational environment (more sorties are normally flown during this period and the operational tempo is normally at its highest). There were 5.53 injuries per 1,000 person-days during months 3 and 4 of the cruise, compared with 4.21 injuries per 1,000 person-days during months 1 and 2 (rate ratio, 1.31; 95% confidence interval, 1.04-1.66; p ϭ 0.018) and 3.41 injuries per 1,000 person-days during months 5 and 6 (rate ratio, 1.62; 95% confidence interval, 1.27-2.09; p Ͻ 0.001).
At the end of a cruise, sailors are often stricken with "get home-itis" and can fail to focus on the job at hand (long-term planning overcomes short-term requirements). During these two deployments, there was no clear statistical correlation between the incidence density of injuries and the number of days on the cruise or whether the ship was in port within the previous 5 days (absolute value of Spearman rank correlation, Ͻ0.20 for all comparisons; results not shown).
The injury rates for the ship compare favorably with Department of Labor statistics for full-time workers, although the two are very dissimilar in scope and method of measurement. There are no clearly comparable statistics that describe a civilian population in the same manner as this military population (with longer work hours; recreational and work injuries and on-and off-shift injuries are all counted), making a true incidence density or rate comparison problematic. The WESTPAC99 injury rate of 5.7% and the WESTPAC02 injury rate of 8.1% for all personnel, including on/off-duty and on/off-shift injuries, are similar to the U.S. Department of Labor statistics, which count recordable injuries for all reported industries while personnel are at work (5.9% in 1999 and 5.4% in 2001). 20 The ship's rates also include nonreportable incidences, as defined by U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) criteria; therefore, the rates are only generally comparable. In addition, ship's personnel normally live in or adjacent to their work environment and labor Ն12 hours per day, often 7 days per week, in contrast to the civilian workforce, which has mishap rates calculated for an 8-hour day and a 40-hour workweek.
Junior personnel most likely suffered higher injury rates for a variety of reasons. The E-1 to E-3 group represented 31% of the ship's population but experienced 51% of all injuries in WESTPAC99 and 57% of all injuries in WESTPAC01. The E-1 to E-3 group is most likely to be junior in age and experience, as well as unfamiliar with equipment, work practices, and the general environment. Younger workers are more likely to be injured than their more acclimatized counterparts. The most junior workers often perform the most physically demanding and least pleasant tasks, increasing their risk of injury. It was impossible to determine the specific reasons from the data gathered for this database and to study why the E-1 to E-3 group suffered the highest rate of injuries. Similarly, the Air, Deck, and Engineering Departments had high percentages of junior personnel and also experienced some of the highest rates of injuries.
The differences in injury densities between the airwing and ship's company personnel were most likely attributable to a number of factors, including differences in job types and working conditions. A separate, in-depth analysis would most likely have to be performed with a prospective cohort to adequately determine these differences. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) World Wide Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System database shows an estimated rate of 14.9% for all nonfatal injuries for U.S. men 15 to 44 years of age (i.e., 14.9% of the workers will be hurt in 1 year, including single workers with multiple injuries). This was based on all work, recreation, and off-shift injuries that were recorded in hospitals that report to the CDC system, extrapolated for the entire 2000 U.S. population and adjusted for age. 21 The ship's rate was lower than this U.S. rate. As shown in Table III , the main points of difference in the top 10 injury causes between the U.S. male population 15 to 44 years of age and this carrier is that unintentional motor vehicle mishaps were not generally a factor during cruises, overexertions were not as common in this generally young and very healthy Navy and Marine workforce, and insect bites and stings were not a problem for the ship's force (as opposed to an infantry force or construction battalion, for example). Slips, trips, and falls were the most common injury summary category during both cruises, similar to general industry. 21 Cuts/punctures and pinches were also leading causes of injuries on the ship.
The category designations do not exactly correspond to OSHA categories, making an ideal comparison impossible. The new reporting criteria developed by the Naval Safety Center for the WESS will allow closer comparisons with OSHA reportable incident rates in general industry but still do not allow or require documentation of every injury treated by Medical Department personnel.
The accident and injury rates experienced by sailors on U.S. Navy submarines during 196 patrols between 1997 and mid-1999 were four to five accidents or injuries per 100 men at sea for 100 days. 22 The work environments are very different for aircraft carriers and submarines, and the submarine data did not include in-port injuries. The DNBI patterns from the Commander, Fifth Fleet (U.S. Navy warships), for 2000-2001 showed 62.7 disease and nonbattle injury visits to a medical treatment facility per 10,000 person-days. It is not possible to adequately compare this summary number, because it includes disease and repeat visits, but the authors of that study found that DNBI rates for aircraft carriers and cruisers/frigates/destroyers were not statistically significantly different. 23 
Conclusions
Injury rates on an aircraft carrier, where men and women work and live 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, for months at a time can be difficult to compare with standard Department of Labor injury statistics. During two cruises, the personnel most at risk on this aircraft carrier were the junior sailors, often the ones who were least trained but tasked with the most physically arduous duties. This cohort experienced approximately two injuries per day that were serious enough to be seen by Medical Department personnel during each of two 6-month deployments. The total injury rates for the cruise were slightly higher than U.S. workforce rates, but the ship's rates also included off-duty, nonwork, and nonreportable injuries, compared with the OSHA reporting procedures. Knowing the types and frequencies of injuries should help safety managers and core leadership safeguard their personnel through proper training and increased vigilance. In particular, slips, trips, and falls and cuts and punctures must be specifically guarded against. The new WESS for the U.S. Navy should assist in better tracking of injuries and causes but still does not capture all injury data. A more-inclusive, standard tracking program would assist in better injury prevention. 
